MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COUNSEL, DISMISSING PETITION, & DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALBILITY

Comes now Kofi Ajabu, Petitioner, pro se under Trial Rule 60 (B) 3, 6 and request relief from Court’s ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COUNSEL, DISMISSING PETITION, & DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALBILIT. In support of Petitioner’s request, the following is stated:

1. On July 20, 2020 Petitioner, pro se, filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
2. Promptly on July 20, 2020 Magistrate Judge filed Notice of availability to exercise jurisdiction.
3. The Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Kofi Ajabu, pro se, is subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
4. Pursuant to this statute, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007).
5. To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face . . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations omitted).
6. In making this determination, the court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiffs. Lee v. City of Chi. 330 F.3d 456, 459 (7^th Cir. 2003).
7. The plaintiff “receives the benefit of imagination” at this stage “[as] long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.” Sanjuan v.Am. Bd. Of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7^th Cir. 1994).
8. Additionally, pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7^th Cir. 2008)
9. Plaintiff is requesting Court’s ruling be set aside because Court is holding pro se Petitioner to the standard as if this petition were drafted by lawyers.

PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF INNOCENCE GATEWAY THROUGH TIME LIMITATION

1. Court acknowledges that Petitioner is correct that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through expiration of the statute of limitations” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, (2013).  (Court Order pg. 2).
2. Petitioner holds that he is innocent because he was convicted of being an accomplish which is a crime for which he was not charged.
3. Court by law in its review must take this claim as true, which it is, and shows that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007).
4. This Court in its ruling says, “To demonstrate actual innocence, a petitioner must show “that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
5. Petitioner, pro se, holds the position that if a juror finds him guilty of a crime for which he is not charged then he is not in a court of law with reasonable jurors, but in a kangaroo court.
6. A kangaroo court is a court that ignores recognized standards of law or justice and often carries little or no official standing in the territory within which it resides. A kangaroo court may ignore due process and come to a predetermined conclusion.
7. The state of Indiana was unsuccessful in proving its charge of murder so manipulated the system by giving the jury instructions on Petitioner being an accomplice. Unfairness arises where prosecutors deliberately manipulate court procedures.
8. If a jury would find Petitioner guilty of the crime of being an accomplice when informed that Petitioner is not charged with being an accomplice, then the jury has ignored Petitioner’s due process and has come to a predetermined conclusion.  Petitioner’s 14^th amendment right to due process is a victim of that court’s process.
9. It has been held that the court should only interfere with the prosecution's decision as to what offences to proceed upon only “in the most obvious circumstances which disclose blatant injustice”. (Canterbury and St Augustine Justices, ex parte Klisiak [1982] QB 398). For Petitioner to be convicted of being an accomplice to murder, for which he was not charged, is an obvious circumstance which discloses blatant injustice. Petitioner was not charged with being an accomplice.  However, Petitioner was convicted of being an accomplice under cause number 71D02-9409-CF-963.
10. Any reasonable jury could not find Petitioner guilty if the information does not charge him with the crime. The crime is not listed in the information as being prosecuted so it stands to reason one cannot be convicted of a crime not charged.
11. It was illegal, unjust, unfair, a blatant ignoring of due process and indication of a kangaroo court to convict Petitioner of a crime with which he was not charged U.S. v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000).    
12. Trial Court became a kangaroo court when it ignored due process and came to a predetermined conclusion when Petitioner was convict of accomplish liability a crime to which he was not charged.

PETITIONER CONVICTED OF CRIME NOT CHARGED IS SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION

1. Petitioner’s custody is illegal, unjust and unfair in that it violates his Sixth Amendment rights which guarantee the right to know the nature of the charges and evidence against an accused and he is thus entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
2. Petitioner has been deprived of the protection of the rule of law and as a result it is unfair for him to continue to serve time illegally. The Court’s jurisdiction does not exist to discipline the prosecutor or other executive arms of the State (although of course it will incidentally do so), but rather to protect the integrity of the processes of justice.
3. Petitioner’s sentence is unconstitutional because he was not charged with being an accomplice, yet he was convicted of being an accomplice.  US v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000).  
4. Under slavery, certain crimes against whites were punishable by death for black offenders but not for white ones In Virginia, for example, over seventy crimes were punishable by death if the perpetrator was black, compared to only one for whites. (BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE, supra note 5. at 139-40)
5. Court is duty bound to protect the integrity of the processes of justice otherwise we have a  court where the outcome is predetermined by historical systemic racism, and not a court of law.
6. In a kangaroo court the jurors decide the facts of this case from the historical racist cultural norm that three young white affluent youth are dead and murdered, three males were in the house when the murders occurred, two of the males are of African descent, so whether they killed anyone or not they are guilty because they were there.
7. This part of America’s history rears its head in this case because Pete Britt, a white friend of these affluent white victims, and who set up the whole drug deal was not charged because the prosecution did not want to mess up his future.
8. Prosecution overcharged Petitioner with murder, and not being an accomplice to murder.
9. An information should embody the material elements of the crime charged I.C. § 35-34-1-2.
10. The offense charged must be stated with such certainty that the accused, the court, and the jury may determine the crime for which conviction is sought. I.C. § 35-34-1-2.
11. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to prepare a defense and to assure he will not twice be put in jeopardy for the same crime Blackburn v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686.
12. Petitioner killed no one, nor did he assist in the death of these precious beings, he was unfortunately just there without invitation when the murders occurred.
13. A juror that would convict Petitioner of a crime of which he is not charged is displaying thinking that has been historically the norm during slavery and beyond, but is not now legal, fair, or just and downright unacceptable in today’s court of law.
14. Chief Justice Roger Taney in the Dred Scott decision before the Supreme Court ruled [People of African Descent] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far, inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
15. This Court’s ruling smacks of Chief Justice Taney thinking.
16.  The 13^th amendment says Slavery is abolished unless one is convicted of a crime.
17. This Court is treating petitioner as a slave who has rights that Court is not bound to recognize.
18.  This Court miraculously holds that petitioner should continue to do prison time on a conviction for a crime of which he was not charged. Court’s thinking is of the past and has no place in todays court of legal opinion.
19. Petitioner does have rights that Court is bound to respect.
20. Petitioner has to be innocent because he was convicted of a crime of which he was not charged but Court holds Petitioner “could have raised his claim that he was convicted as an accomplice, but not charged as an accomplice, before his statute of limitations expired.
21. In other words, petitioner is innocent of murder, and wasn’t charged with being an accomplice to murder, but since he did not say so earlier the court rules petitioner should continue to do the prison time. There is no justice in Court’s position and is a resurrection of the thought of Chief Justice Taney.
22.  Court is aware there is no statute of limitations for murder but Court is taking the position there is a statute of limitations for an innocent man to raise his innocence of murder.
23. It took Charles Taney III, a relative of Chief Justice Taney, one hundred and sixty years after the decision to apologize to Lynne Jackson, a relative of Dred Scott, for this racist ruling by Chief Justice Taney (Washington Post, 6March2017).
24. This Court should follow suit by setting aside its January 12^th,  , 2021 ruling.
25. This Court’s position is not legal nor just and sustains Chief Taney’s thought that Petitioner, a man of African descent has rights but none a court of law is due to respect. Kangaroo courts must cease and desist.
26. Innocence serves as a gateway through expiration of the statute of limitations”  McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, (2013).
27. In making this determination, the court is supposed to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiffs. Lee v. City of Chi. 330 F.3d 456, 459 (7^th Cir. 2003).
28. The plaintiff “receives the benefit of imagination” at this stage “[as] long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.” Sanjuan v.Am. Bd. Of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7^th Cir. 1994).

JUDGE DORIS L. PRYOR’S SCHEDULING ORDER

1. On January 8, 2021 Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor scheduled this action for a status Conference.
2. Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor signed this order.
3. Petitioner took Judge Doris L. Pryor’s order as the court doing as it supposed to do which is by law is to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the Petitioner and taking Petitioner’s position that he was convicted of a crime for which he was not charged as being true, which it is.
4. Petitioner took Judge Pryor’s scheduling as giving the Petitioner the benefit of her imagination, as the law says she should, and that she could see him being innocent of a crime of which he was not charged even with the race implications of three affluent youth murdered and Petitioner, a man of African descent being present but not committing murder and was not charged in a way he could be held accountable for the murders when he was not the murderer.
5. Yet, three days later, on January 11, 2021 it is docketed that Judge Pryor committed an error which raises an array of questions.
6. Judge Pryor scheduled and signed her order. Petitioner is supposed to believe such an esteemed Judge with all the Court’s checks and balances in place that her ruling made is to the official docket and it was not her intent?
7. Petitioner has already experienced ineffective assistance of counsel and fraudulent behavior by Ken Roberts, his trial counsel, who signed an affidavit that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and then got in court under oath testifying the signature on the affidavit was his but he didn’t remember signing it or if he did he didn’t read it. Did someone get to Judge Pryor as someone got to Attorney Roberts?
8. Or was her error that she saw the injustice being perpetrated on Petitioner and decided to uphold the law as she is sworn to do?
9. Or was her error she just doesn’t subscribe to the Justice Taney school of thought as the ruling of James Patrick Hanlon who is a Trump appointed judge does.
10. Could Judge Pryor have seen Trump supporters’ attempt to overthrow the due process of a legitimate election and understood she would be complicit in this insurrection if she let this injustice to Petitioner continue to progress illegally and unjustly?
11. Could Judge Hanlon have been mad, and upset that the January 6, 2021 insurrection in Washington D.C. was not successful, so he put Judge Pryor, a woman of African descent under pressure which made her change her order under duress?
12. Trump appointee Justice Hanlon erred by not viewing Petitioner’s innocence in the light most favorable to Petitioner nor is Justice Hanlon giving Petitioner the benefit of imagination as Court is by law required to do, as Justice Pryor in her ruling did do.
13. Was Judge Pryor bullied into vacating her ruling? Petitioner is due an answer to how Justice Pryor’s ruling got to the docket in error.
14. Petitioner is actually innocent of killing anyone. Petitioner just needs this Court to accept his innocence as by law it is supposed to do.

COURT’S RULING VIOLATES PETITIONER’S 14 AMENDMENT RIGHT

1. Petitioner has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of the charges alleged against him according to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   The United States Supreme Court has stated that charging information must contain every element of the offense sought to be charged and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.  Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895).  The crime must be charged with precision and certainty, and every ingredient of which it is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged and leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and the court of the exact offence intended to be charged.  Evans v. United States, 153 US 584, 587 (1894).
2. Petitioner being convicted of a crime of which he was not charged is new evidence.
3. Court wrote “New evidence’ in this context does not mean ‘newly discovered evidence’; it just means evidence that was not presented at trial. And because an actual-innocence claim ‘involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record’” Jones v. Calloway, 842 F.3d 454, 461 (7^th Cir. 2016).
4. If Petitioner were aware of this requirement in the above context he would have addressed it in that context to his limited capability.
5. Petitioner placed in his petition the following:

Ajabu was charged with murder but was convicted for being an accomplice to murder. Final Jury Instructions 2, 3, and 4 were given to the jury. Final Jury Instructions 2, 3, and 4 are based on the accomplice liability statute. The accomplice liability instructions confused the jury because the crimes of which Mr. Ajabu allegedly abetted were not delineate within these instructions. A crime must be part of a charging information or it cannot be presented to a jury U.S. v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000). To allow the jury to be instructed on “Accomplice Liability” when it was not part of the charging information is in conflict with Franklin, supra and the United States Constitution. Plaintiff, Mr. Ajabu, recognizes contravening Indiana State authority to his argument. See Tyler v. State, 292 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1973); See also Carter vs. State, 353 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. App. 1976). Mr. Ajabu assert Tyler, supra and the Indiana Court of Appeals Opinion in this case conflicts with Franklin, supra. The conflict is between laws made by the federal government and laws made by Indiana. Where a conflict exists then federal law controls. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI); states: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” When a state passes a law that conflicts with a federal ruling then the federal court has the power and duty to declare that state ruling unconstitutional and unenforceable. An information should embody the material elements of the crime charged I.C. § 35-34-1-2. The offense charged must be stated with such certainty that the accused, the court, and the jury may determine the crime for which conviction is sought. I.C. § 35-34-1-2. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to prepare a defense and to assure he will not twice be put in jeopardy for the same crime Blackburn v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686. Ajabu did not have notice that preparation for his defense should encompass being an accomplice to Walls, or Adams in any crime especially the crime of murder. Ajabu’s conviction for being an accomplice is in error. See Johnson v. State 490 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 1986). (Petitioner’s Amended Emergency Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus Injunctive, And Declaratory Relief pgs 9 – 11 Paragraphs 34-50).

JUSTICE CRIES OUT FOR COURT TO APPOINT PETITIONER A LAWYER

1. Petitioner, pro se, and because he is not a lawyer, thought paragraph 41, of his initial amended petition would inform Court that jury was not made aware that it was being given instructions for “accomplish liability” a crime of which Petitioner was not charged.
2. Court is required by law so pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7^th Cir. 2008)
3. This is part of the reason why Petitioner is asking Court to set aside its order denying Petitioner of appointed counsel.
4. Court acknowledges that Petitioner is correct that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through expiration of the statute of limitations” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, (2013).  
5. Petitioner not to have raised his claim that he was convicted as an accomplice, but not charged as an accomplice, before his statute of limitations expired is of no consequence because Petitioner’s actual innocence is a gateway through expiration of the statute of limitations” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, (2013).  
6. Court is judging Petitioner’s ignorance on how to present this action as evidence of guilt. Court’s position is unfair, illegal and not in the spirit of justice. Court for the sake of justice should set aside its order and grant Petitioner adequate counsel.
7. The American system, has long erred on the side of protecting innocence. Thus, we presume an accused person's innocence until they are proven guilty. As the preeminent English jurist William Blackstone wrote,"[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer" (Alexander Volokh, "n Guilty Men," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1997): 173-216).
8. With the assistance of a competent lawyer Petitioner would be able to show at trial how he consistently conversated with Kevin Scionti about how the jury was given instruction on accomplish liability when he was not charged with that crime.
9. With the assistance of a competent legal counsel Petitioner would have introduced an affidavit signed by Ken Roberts, another one of his lawyers, stating he provided Petitioner with ineffective assistance of counsel and who took the stand under oath and admitted the signature on the affidavit was his, but he did not remember signing it or if he did sign it was without reading the document. (Affidavit attached).
10. This is fraud committed upon the court, and indicates perjury, but because Petitioner is pro se and not aware of how to raise the issue is more than enough reason to grant Petitioner’s request for adequate counsel.
11. It has been held that relief from a judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a “reasonable time,” which might be after the time stated in the rule had run. Fiske v. Buder (C.C.A.8th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 841; see also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. (C.C.A.9th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 213.
12. With adequate counsel Petitioner would have been able to show how he continued to conversate with appellate counsel Eric Koselke to raise the issue of him being convicted of a crime of which he was not charged.
13. Petitioner is indigent.
14. Whenever . . . the court determines that the interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any financially eligible person who . . . is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28.
15. The interest of justice that Court should grant appointment of counsel for Petitioner.

EXHAUSTING STATE REMEDIES IS ABUSE OF PROCESS

1. Court holds as for Petitioner’s claim for release due to the COVID -19 pandemic, he has failed to show that he exhausted state court remedies before filing his petition.
2. Petitioner respectfully asserts that to make Petitioner file this action in state court is an abuse of process with deadly consequences. Here’s why.
3. The Court has recognized abuse of process if ‘the prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by the law .  (Cited – Regina v Klisiak; Regina v Ramsgate Justices, ex parte Warren ([1981] CLY 549)
4. Several district courts, and even the United States Supreme Court has ruled that prisoners serving time with this pandemic is a violation of the prisoners eighth amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
5. In the case of Mark Williams v. Craig Wilson, Et al, in the United States Northern District Court of Ohio the prisoners sought habeas relief arguing that COVID-19 created unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the facility.  The district court granted an injunction and ordered the enlargement of the conditions of the inmates’ confinement.  Order Dated 4/22/2020. 
6. The respondents in that case petitioned the United States Supreme to block the order but the United States Supreme Court refused, Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1041.
7. When the United States Supreme Court weighed in that to be incarcerated in federal court with the virus is a violation of prisoners eighth amendment right then it stands to reason to be imprisoned in state court with the virus is also cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of prisoners eighth amendment right.
8. Some legal technicalities govern legal procedure/process, enable or restrict access to courts, and/or enable or limit the discretion of a court in handing down judgment. The process or procedure is a legal technicality. Legal technicalities should not stand in the way of justice.
9. To require Petitioner in this life-or-death situation to unnecessarily seek state remedy is using legal technicality to stand in the way of justice.
10. The inherent jurisdiction of the court to stop a prosecution to prevent an abuse of process is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances: Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] Q.B. 630, CA; Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2004] 2 A.C. 72, HL. The essential focus of the doctrine is on preventing unfairness at trial, through which the defendant is prejudiced in the presentation of his or her case. This inherent duty of the court does not stop at the trial level but extends throughout the complete judicial process.
11. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts are diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Petitioner is raising United States Constitutional issues which justifies federal court jurisdiction as court of origin. It is also important to note that even if a party to the case attempts to avoid federal jurisdiction by failing to allege a question of federal law in the complaint and only pleading state law in a claim filed in state court, where the claim under state law is completely trumped by federal law, the federal courts will retain subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
12. The federal court rulings on prisoners doing time with Covid – 19 violates prisoners eighth amendment right trumps any ruling that would be made by a state. To ignore this fact is to make Petitioner go through a frivolous to exhaust state remedy when federal rulings already dictate the outcome of any state ruling.
13. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and §2254 (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); Article I, § 9, cl 2 of the US Constitution (Suspension Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
14. Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) because the Petitioner is in custody in this judicial district and venue.  Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Petitioner’s claim occurred in this district. 
15. Court by law in its review must take this claim as true, which it is, and shows that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007).
16. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI); states: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
17. A state cannot pass a law that conflicts with a federal ruling then the federal court has the power and duty to declare that state ruling unconstitutional and unenforceable.
18. This Court ruling Petitioner to exhaust state remedy is an abuse of procedure considering the Supreme Court’s ruling.

PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED RIGHT TO APPEAL

1. Rule 4 of the RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS states that:
2. The clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court's assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.
3. “A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a federal district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017.
4. Instead, the petitioner must first obtain a certificate of appealability See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1). “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2).
5. When a claim is resolved on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability should issue only if reasonable jurists could disagree about the merits of the underlying constitutional claim and about whether the procedural ruling was correct Flores-Ramirez v. Foster, 811 F.3d 861, 865 (7^th Cir. So16) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
6. The Honorable Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor on January 8^th, 2021 issued a scheduling order setting this action for a telephone status conference on February 8^th, 2021.
7. On January 11^th, 2021 the Hon. Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor vacated the scheduled telephone status conference.
8. Petitioner, because of questions raised in above paragraphs 51-64 believes Justice Pryor’s scheduling order was not in error and shows Justice Pryor’s disagreement with Justice Hanlon on whether the merits of Petitioner’s underlying constitutional clam was correct.
9. Justice Pryor must be viewed as a reasonable jurist although Justice Hanlon may differ.
10. Because Justice Pryor was appointed to the bench and confirmed her appearance of disagreement with Justice Hanlon is grounds to which Petitioner should be granted the right to appeal Justice Hanlon’s denial of Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.
11. Petitioner believes that the appellate court will see the merits as Judge Pryor appears to see.
12. For Petitioner to be denied appealing his justified claim of actual innocence would show that Justice Taney’s school of thought is unfortunately still alive and well do to a Trump appointment to the bench.
13. The circumstances in this filing are literally a matter of life and death.
14. Since this petition was filed the Indiana Department of Corrections on its website has listed another prisoner death (https://www.in.gov/idoc/about-idoc/idoc-facility-covid-19-statistics/ ).
15. Each day that passes is an opportunity for Covid-19 to invade and deteriorate bodies to the point of death in society and especially in the prisons.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Kofi Ajabu, pro se, request Court under Trial Rule 60 (B) 3, 6 set aside its order DENYING MOTION FOR COUNSEL, DISMISSING PETITION, & DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALBILITY  and if not set aside in the alternative, allow Petitioner to appeal, or if so set aside order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may promptly order.

Dated: January 26, 2021                                                         Respectfully submitted,

                                                                                                        /s/ Kofi M. Ajabu

                                                                                                        Kofi M. Ajabu

                                                                                                        DOC #955750

                                                                                                        Wabash Valley CF                                                                                                                                                                     6908 S. Old U.S. Highway 41

                                                                                                        P.O. Box 1111

                                                                                                        Carlisle, IN 47838